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1 Introduction
The competition among colleges to attract high quality students has led to
the adoption of early admissions programs over the last five decades, and
turned the college admissions process into a complicated ‘admissions game’
in the United States.3 Today the most prominent colleges oﬀer a choice over
a variety of admissions programs: ‘early action’, ‘single-choice early action’,
‘early decision’, and ‘regular decision’. According to the 2005 Early Col-
lege Application Directory of the National Association for College Admission
Counseling (NACAC), of all four-year postsecondary institutions about seven
percent oﬀer early decision plan while about eight percent oﬀer early action
plan.4 These figures are indeed much higher for top private institutions. As
documented by Avery et.al. (2003), nearly 70 percent of the 281 private
institutions ranked by the U.S. News College Guide as the “Best National
Universities” and the “Best Liberal Arts Colleges” in the United States oﬀer
an early admissions program.
While early action allows a student a chance to gain an admission de-
cison in the fall without a commitment to attend, early decision requires
the student to apply early to only one college and matriculate if admitted.
Single-choice early action programs restrict the student to apply to the early
action programs of only one college. Early action and decision programs usu-
ally require highschool seniors to apply near November with a decision by
late December. Regular decision oﬀers a later application deadline (January
1) and time to decide whether to matriculate until the National Common
Reply Date (May 1).5
3In 1954-55 Harvard, Princeton and Yale introduced the A-B-C program that give
students of feeder highschools, from where these colleges mostly recruited, a preliminary
indication of the likely outcome of their applications. In 1959, Barnard, Bryn Mawr, Mount
Holyoke, Radcliﬀ, Smith, Vassar, and Wellesley introduced the Early Decision programs.
See Avery et.al. (2003) for an extensive account of the history of early admissions in
United States.
4NACAC 2005 Early College Application Directory also indiates that the institutions
“... most likely to oﬀer early decision include highly selective colleges (50 percent), colleges
with lower yield rates (24 percent of colleges that enroll less than 30 percent of admitted
applicants and 27 percent of colleges that enroll 30 to 45 percent of admitted applicants),
colleges that enroll fewer than 3,000 students (25 percent), colleges in the New England
(38 percent) and Middle States regions (32 percent), and private colleges (26 percent).”
(See page 23 of State of College Admission 2006 at http://www.nacacnet.org.)
5For 2007-2008 academic year, MIT oﬀers early action and regular action, Harvard and
Yale oﬀer single-choice early action and regular decision, Princeton and UPenn oﬀer single-
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In the face of this highly sophisticated admissions process, a highschool
senior considering higher education has to decide not only which colleges to
apply but also when to apply. His or her decision on which early programs to
apply is even further clouded by the lack of information on whether he or she
will be eligible for financial aid and if so how much, since colleges do not fi-
nalize the aid package until regular decision period.6 The growing complexity
of college admissions game stirred public concern over the competitiveness
and the eﬃciency of the higher education market which is substantiated by
a recent study by Avery et.al. (2003). This study finds that early decision
applicants gain an admission advantage by applying early that is equivalent
of 100 additional SAT points. It also confirms that these applicants tend
to come from aﬄuent socioeconomic backgrounds, while students seeking for
financial aid postpone their admission to the regular decision period.
Being the first to introduce early action program over 30 years ago, Har-
vard College recently announced that it will eliminate early admissions be-
ginning in the fall of 2007 with the purpose of making the admissions process
simpler and fairer and the hope of being a leading example again, only this
time to reverse the course.7 A week after, Princeton University and Uni-
versity of Virginia, independently, announced that they will also end their
early admissions (decision) programs and admit all undergraduates through
a single process, beginning next year.8
Motivated by these recently sparked controversies about the early ad-
missions programs, we study in this paper college admissions problem, in-
troduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) and reformulated by Roth (1985), in
a model with early decision and analyze the strategic issues involved. Our
model considers many-to-one matching problems (markets) involving two pe-
riods: an early decision period and a regular decision period. There are two
finite and disjoint sets of agents, say colleges and students. Each college has
a finite overall capacity that limits the number of students it can accept in
choice early decison and regular decision to name a few. Although some colleges drop the
‘single-choice’ qualifier in their early admissions programs and call it early action (as done
by Harvard), they indicate that they keep the right to rescind their oﬀer of admission to
a student who applies elsewhere for early action programs.
6The elimination of “the Overlap” process in the early 90s by the Justice Department
on antitrust grounds has subsequently increased competition among schools via financial
aid bidding. See Hoxby (2000).
7“Harvard to Eliminate Early Admission,” Harvard Gazette, September 14, 2006.
8News@Princeton and UVA Today, November 25, 2006.
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the two periods, and each student can enroll to at most one school during
the whole matching process. In the regular decison period, each college has
a preference relation over the set of groups of students which is responsive to
its preference over the set of students and each student has a preference rela-
tion over the set of colleges and being unmatched. The capacities of colleges
together with the preference profiles of colleges and students in the regular
decision period constitute a regular decision market.
In the early decision period, each college announces out of its total ca-
pacity an early decision quota, which it aims to fill with respect to its early
decision preference ordering that is responsive to some restriction of its reg-
ular decision preference ordering on a subset of students. On the other side
of the market, an admissible preference ordering of each student in the early
decision period is the restriction of his or her preference ordering in the reg-
ular decision period on a singleton subset of colleges. The quotas of colleges
together with the preference profiles of colleges and students in the early
decision period define an early decision market. Clearly, for each regular
decision market, there is a set of induced early decision markets.9
An allocation in the early decision period is a many-to-one early decision
matching where no college is assigned more students than its early decision
quota and no student is assigned more than one college. Given a binding
early decision matching, an allocation in the regular decision period is a
many-to-one regular decision matching where all the assignments realized in
the early decision are preserved, no college is assigned more students than
its overall capacity and no student is assigned more than one college. We
call any assignment that did not exist in the early decision period and realize
in the regular decision period as a regular assignment. We assume that any
student rejected from a college in the early decision period can still apply to
the same college in the regular decision period.10
A matching in the early decision period is stable if no student prefers
remaining unassigned to his or her assignment, no college prefers having a
student slot vacant rather than filling it with one of its assignments, and
9Many colleges and universities have priority categories for athletes, alumni children,
and minorities. We assume that the total capacity of each college in our model is net of
its priority quota.
10As pointed out by Avery et.al. (2003), “...historically most colleges rejected 5 percent
or fewer of their early applicants in December. Some, such as Cornell, Georgetown, MIT,
and Tufts, have automatically deferred to the regular pool all early applicants who are not
admitted in December.”
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there exists no unmatched college-student pair such that the college prefers
the student to one of its assignments or keeping a vacant slot (if any) or the
student prefers the college to his or her assignment. Given a matching real-
ized in the early decision period, a matching in the regular decision period is
stable if no student having a regular assignment prefers remaining unassigned
to his or her assignment, no college prefers having a regularly assigned stu-
dent slot vacant rather than filling it with one of its regular assignments, and
there exists no unmatched college-student pair such that the college prefers
the student to one of its regular assignments or keeping a vacant slot (if any)
or the student prefers the college to his or her regular assignment.
An early decision matching rule selects a matching for every early decision
market, and is stable if it selects a stable matching for every early decision
market. A regular decision matching rule selects a matching for every regular
decision market, given any matching in any early decision market induced
by the associated regular decision market. A regular decision matching rule
is stable at an early decision matching rule if it selects a stable matching
for every regular decision market, given any realization of the early decision
matching rule in any early decision market induced by the associated regular
decision market.
An early decision rule and a regular decision rule as an ordered pair form
a matching system. A matching system is stable if it involves a stable early
decision rule at which the regular matching rule in the system is also stable.
We first study manipulation of a matching system via early decision quo-
tas and preferences, and show that there is no matching system that is stable
and either nonmanipulable by colleges via early decision quotas or nonma-
nipulable by colleges or students via early decision preferences.
Next, we analyze the Nash equilibria of the game in which the preferences
of colleges and students are common knowledge and each college determines a
quota for the early decision period given its total capacity for the two periods.
Under college-optimal and student-optimal matching systems, we show that
there may not be a pure strategy equilibrium. So, we restrict preferences to
ensure the existence of pure strategy equilibria. We prove that when either
colleges or students have common preferences over the other set of agents,
‘terminating early decision program’ becomes a weakly dominant strategy for
each college if every student, choosing to act early, applies to his or her top
choice college irrespective of the early decision quotas of colleges.11 Relaxing
11Assumption of common preferences for colleges is justified, in page 29 of State of
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the said restriction on the early decision preferences of students appropriately,
we can obtain ‘oﬀering as well as not oﬀering an early decision program’ as
a Nash equilibrium strategy of the early decision quota reporting game.
Our results can be related to those in the literature dealing with manip-
ulation of preferences or quotas under two-sided matching in a single-period.
Roth (1982) shows that there is no stable matching rule which is immune to
preference manipulation. Mongell and Roth (1990) report a high percentage
of truncated preference profiles (single alternative preference) submitted in
sorority rush. Roth and Vande Vate (1991) show that in a decentralized
one-to-one matching with random matching process, for any strategies of the
other players, each player will always have a truncation strategy as a best
response. Roth and Rothblum (1999) introduce the truncation of the true
preferences as a potentially profitable strategic behavior, instead of changing
the order of true preferences, in a low information environment in one-to-one
matchings. Sönmez (1999) shows that there is no stable matching rule in
hospital-intern markets which is immune to manipulation via early contract-
ing (unraveling) between a hospital and a single intern.12
Definitely, the closest papers to ours are by Sönmez (1997) and Konishi
and Ünver (2006). Sönmez (1997) shows that in a single-shot hospital-intern
market there is no stable matching rule that is nonmanipulable by hospitals
via underreporting capacities. Konishi and Ünver (2006) study a capacity
manipulation game for hospital-intern markets with a single decision pe-
riod. They show that under two most widely used matching rules, namely
hospital-optimal and intern-optimal stable rules, there may not be a pure
strategy equilibrium in general, and whenever a pure strategy equilibrium
exists, every hospital weakly prefers this equilibrium outcome to the outcome
of any larger capacity profile. Konishi and Ünver (2006) also consider two
restrictions on preferences, each of which guarantees the existence of a pure
strategy equilibrium. The first restriction requires hospitals to always prefer
College Admission 2006 at http://www.nacacnet.org, by the common top factors in the
college admission decision for all colleges and universities enlisted as: grades in college
preparatory courses, admission test scores (such as ACT or SAT), and overall grades.
However, arguments for common preferences for students are less appealing because of the
students’ concerns over the locations of, and the financial aid packages oﬀered by, colleges.
12Unraveling was previously studied by Roth and Xing (1994) showing that the in-
stability of matchings realized at the final date of transactions are neither necessary or
suﬃcient for the unraveling to occur. The two potential causes of unraveling are evolving
uncertainty and the exercise of market power.
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a larger set of acceptable interns to a smaller set. By that, reporting the
number of assigned interns is an equilibrium strategy if the matching rule is
hospital-optimal, whereas under the intern-optimal matching rule reporting
the actual capacity is a weakly dominant strategy. The second restriction
requires common preferences of one group of agents (hospitals or interns)
over the other group and ensures that reporting the true capacity is always
a weakly dominant strategy for colleges.
Although, we benefit from Sönmez (1997) and Konishi and Ünver (2006)
both in the exposition and the analysis of our model, we depart from them
as well as from the rest of the literature in a significant respect: we are not
interested in the strategic incentives of colleges (corresponding to hospitals
in some previous studies) in reporting their total capacities. In our model,
the total capacity of each college over the two-period admissions process
is fixed and common knowledge. Leaving aside the strategic considerations
about preferences that we partially address in this study, what colleges rather
determine here is the strategic allocation of their total available capacities
over the two admission periods. In this regard, our paper aims to obtain
some belated insights about the early decision system at a time of possible
termination in the entire United States.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 gives results on manipulability of matching systems via
preferences and quotas. Section 4 defines an early decision quota game and
characterizes restrictions on preferences to ensure the existence of a pure
strategy equilibrium. Finally Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Basic Structures
We consider many-to-one matching problems (markets) involving two peri-
ods: an early decision period and a regular decision period. A matching
(college admissions) market is denoted by the list (C, S, qR, qE, RR, RE).13
The first two components are non-empty, finite and disjoint sets of colleges
C = c1, c2, ..., cm and students S = s1, s2, ..., sn. The third component is a
13This exposition of a matching market as well as a number of definitions that we shall
introduce below simply extend the basic structures in the one-stage matching model of
Sönmez (1997), studying capacity manipulation problem in hospital-intern markets.
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vector of positive natural numbers qR = (qRc1 , ..., q
R
cm), where q
R
c is the total
capacity of college c during the whole decision process involving both the
early decision and the regular decision. The fourth component is a vector of
nonnegative natural numbers qE = (qEc1, ..., q
E
cm), where q
E
c ∈ {0, 1, ..., qRc } is
the quota of college c in the early decision period. The fifth component is a
list of preference relations RR = (RRc1, ..., R
R
cm, R
R
s1 , ..., R
R
sn) where R
R
c is the
preference relation of college c and RRs is the preference relation of student
s in the regular decision period. (We will sometimes call these preferences
simply as “regular preferences”.) The last component in the matching prob-
lem, RE, denotes the preference relations of colleges and students in the early
decision period. The lists (qE, RE) and (qR, RR) for a given society hC,Si are
called the early decision market and the regular decision market, respectively.
For any c ∈ C, RRc is a binary preference relation that is a linear order
on ΣRc = 2S. Similarly, for any s ∈ S, RRs is a binary relation that is a
linear order on ΣRs = {{c1}, {c2}, ....{cm}, ∅}. Let RRc and RRs respectively
denote the class of all preference relations for college c ∈ C and for student
s ∈ S, and let PRk denote the strict preference relation associated with the
preference relation RRk for agent k ∈ C ∪ S. Define also RR =
Q
k∈C∪SRRk .
The preference relation RRc of college c ∈ C is said to be responsive (Roth,
1985) whenever for all S0 ⊂ S it is true that
i) for all s ∈ S\S0, S0 ∪ {s}PRc S0 if and only if {s}PRc ∅,
ii) for all s, s0 ∈ S\S0, S0 ∪ {s}PRc S0 ∪ {s0} if and only if {s}PRc {s0}.
For any college c and any RRc ∈ RRc , projection of RRc over S ∪ {∅} is
denoted by RRc [S] and satisfies
i) for all s ∈ S, {s}RRc [S] ∅ if and only if {s}RRc ∅,
ii) for all s, s0 ∈ S, {s}RRc [S] {s0} if and only if {s}RRc {s0}.
Any responsive preference RRc ∈ RRc is said to be responsive to RRc [S].
(Notice that preferences of students over the individual colleges are trivially
responsive. We will usually represent strict preferences of the agents by the
ordered, from top to bottom, list of acceptable mates.)
Define for all qR ∈ Nn+, QEc (qR) = {0, 1, ..., qRc } for c ∈ C and QE(qR) =Q
c∈C QEc (qR). Let QE = ∪qR QE(qR).
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For any c ∈ C, let ΣEc ⊆ ΣRc . Then for a given RRc ∈ RRc , let REc (RRc )
denote the class of all preference relations of college c such that any REc ∈
REc (RRc ) is a restriction of RRc to ΣEc . For convenience, introduce, for all
c ∈ C, the notation REc (RRc , qE) = REc (RRc ) for all qE ∈ QE(qR) and for all
qR ∈ Nn+.
At this point, we introduce the following notation that will be useful. For
any finite set X, any linear order R defined over X ∪ {∅}, and any positive
integer l ≤ |X|+ 1, denote by Top(R; l) the lth-ranked element, from top, of
X ∪ {∅} under R.
For any s ∈ S, let ΣEs ⊆ ΣRs such that |ΣEs | ≤ 1. Then for a given
RR ∈ RR, the early decision preference, REs , of any student s is a restric-
tion of RRs to ΣEs . Moreover, we assume that for any s ∈ S, REs is par-
ticipatory; i.e., for given RR ∈ RR, qR ∈ Nn+, and qE ∈ QE(qR), we have
Top(REs ; 1) ∈ C whenever REc = RRc and qEc = qRc for all c. Note that the as-
sumption of participatory early decision preferences is minimally restrictive
in the sense that it requires every student to apply early one of the colleges in
the college admissions market when he or she does not distinguish between
the early decision and regular decision periods in terms of the preferences
and quotas of colleges.14 Let REs (RRs ) denote the class of all such preference
relations of student s. Thus, we have constructed (single-choice) early de-
cision preferences. For convenience, introduce, for all s ∈ S, the notation
REs (RRs , qE) = REs (RRs ) for all qE ∈ QE(qR), given any qR ∈ Nn+.
For all k ∈ C ∪ S, define REk = ∪(RRk ,qE)REk (RRk , qE). For any k ∈ C ∪ S,
and any REk ∈ REk , denote by PEk the respective strict preference relation.
Also define RE(RR, qE) = Qk∈C∪SREk (RRk , qE) and RE = ∪(RR,qE)RE(RR,
qE).
For given C and S, define ER = Nn+×
Q
k∈C∪SRRk , the class of all matching
problems in the regular decision period. For any (qR, RR) ∈ ER and qE ∈
QE(qR), define also EE(qR, RR, qE) = {qE} ×Qk∈C∪SREk (RRk , qE), the class
of all matching problems in the early decision period induced by (qR, RR, qE).
Let EE = ∪(qR,RR) ∪qE∈QE(qR) EE(qR, RR, qE).
14However, we do not require students to apply early to their top choice colleges under
participatory preferences since they may be willing to compromise under an early decision
plan where they can only submit a single choice.
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2.2 Matching Systems
A matching μE in the early decision period for a given profile, qE, of early
decision quotas is a function from the set C ∪ S into 2C∪S such that:
i) for all s ∈ S, |μE(s)| ≤ 1 and μE(s) ⊆ C;
ii) for all c ∈ C, |μE(c)| ≤ qEc and μE(c) ⊆ S;
iii) for all (c, s) ∈ C × S, μE(s) = {c} if and only if s ∈ μE(c).
We denote the set of all matchings for a given qE by ME(qE) and the
set of all matchings in the early decision period byME. Given a preference
relation REs of student s ∈ S, we say that s prefers matching μE1 to matching
μE2 if and only if it prefers μE1 (s) to μE2 (s). We do the same for each college.
Given a matching μE realized in the early decision period and a capacity
vector qR, we define a matching μR in the regular decision period as a func-
tion from the set C ∪ S into 2C∪S such that:
i) for all s ∈ S, |μR(s)| ≤ 1, and μE(s) ⊆ μR(s) ⊆ C;
ii) for all c ∈ C, |μR(c)| ≤ qRc , and μE(c) ⊆ μR(c) ⊆ S;
iii) for all (c, s) ∈ C × S, μR(s) = {c} if and only if s ∈ μR(c).
We notice that the function μR preserves the matchings achieved under
μE in the early decision period, i.e. early decisions are binding. Here, we
denote the set of all matchings in the regular decision period for a given
(qR, μE) byMR(qR, μE) and the set of all matchings in the regular decision
period byMR. Given a preference relation RRs of student s ∈ S, we say that
s prefers matching μR1 to matching μR2 in the regular decision period if and
only if s prefers μR1 (s) to μR2 (s). We do the same for each college.
For a given preference profile R ∈ RE ∪ RR, let A(Rc) denote the set
of acceptable students for college c, i.e., A(Rc) = {s ∈ S : sPc ∅}, where P
denotes the strict preference profile associated with R. Similarly, let A(Rs)
denote the set of acceptable colleges for student s, i.e., A(Rs) = {c ∈ C :
c Ps ∅}.
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The acceptable choice of a college c from a group of students T ⊆ S in
the early decision market (qE, RE) is defined as
ChEc (R
E
c , q
E
c , T ) = {T 0 ⊆ T ∩A(REc ) : |T 0| ≤ qEc , T 0REc T
00
for all T
00 ⊆ T such that |T 00| ≤ qEc }.
Similarly, for a given realization μE in the early decision period, the ac-
ceptable choice of a college c from a group of students T ⊆ S\μE(c) available
for assignment in the regular decision market (qR, RR) is defined as
ChRc (R
R
c , q
R
c , μ
E, T ) = {T 0 ⊆ T ∩A(RRc ) : |T 0| ≤ qRc − |μE(c)|,
T 0 ∪ μE(c)RRc T
00 ∪ μE(c) for all T 00 ⊆ T
such that |T 00| ≤ qRc − |μE(c)|}.
In the early decision period, for a given qE, a matching μE ∈ ME(qE)
is blocked by student s ∈ S if ∅PEs μE(s), and blocked by college c ∈ C if
μE(c) 6= ChEc (REc , qEc , μE(c)). A matching μE is said to be acceptable to a
college that does not block it in the early decision. Similarly, μE is said to
be acceptable to a student who does not block it in the early decision. A
matching μE is blocked by a college-student pair (c, s) ∈ C×S if {c}PEs μE(s)
and μE(c) 6= ChEc (REc , qEc , μE(c) ∪ {s}). A matching μE is stable if it is not
blocked by a student, a college, or a college-student pair.
We denote the set of stable matchings in the early decision market (qE, RE)
by SE(qE, RE). In this set, there exists a matching μEC(qE, RE), called the
college-optimal stable matching in the early decision period, such that
μEC(q
E, RE)(c)REc μ
E(c)
for all c ∈ C and for all μE ∈ SE(qE, RE).
Analogously, there is a student-optimal stable matching in the early deci-
sion period, μES (q
E, RE), that every student likes as well as any other stable
matching.
Given an early decision matching μE, a regular decision matching μR ∈
MR(qR, μE) is blocked by student s ∈ S in the regular decision period if
∅PRs μR(s)\μE(s). A matching μR ∈ MR(qR, μE) is blocked by college
c ∈ C in the regular decision period if μR(c)\μE(c) 6= ChRc (RRc , qRc , μE,
μR(c)\μE(c)). A matching μR is said to be acceptable to a college that
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does not block it in the regular decision. Similarly, μR is said to be accept-
able to a student who does not block it in the regular decision. A matching
μR ∈ MR(qR, μE) is blocked by a college-student pair (c, s) ∈ C × S in
the regular decision period if μE(s) = ∅, {c}PRs μR(s) and μR(c)\μE(c) 6=
ChRc (Rc, qRc , μE, {s} ∪ μR(c)\μE(c)). A matching μR is stable if it is not
blocked by a student, a college, or a college-student pair. Given the early
decision μE, we denote the set of stable matchings in the regular deci-
sion market (qR, RR) by SR((qR, RR), μE). This set contains a matching
μRC((qR, RR), μE), called the college-optimal stable matching in the regular
decision period, such that
μC((q
R, RR), μE)(c)RRc μ
R(c)
for all c ∈ C and for all μR ∈ SR((qR, RR), μE).
Analogously, there is a student-optimal stable matching in the regular
decision period, μS((qR, RR), μE), that every student likes as well as any
other stable matching.15
We say, as similar in Roth and Sotomayor (1990), that for given (qE, RE)
∈ EE, college c and student s are achievable for one another in the early
decision if there is some stable matching in SE(qE, RE) at which they are
matched. Likewise, we define achievability in the regular decision.
A matching rule in the early decision period is a function ϕE : EE →ME
such that for all (qE, RE) ∈ EE, we have ϕE(qE, RE) ∈ ME(qE). Let ϕ¯E
denote the set of all matching rules in the early decision period.
A matching rule in the regular decision period is a function ϕR : ER ×
ME →MR such that for all (qR, RR) ∈ ER, for all qE ∈ QE(qR), and for all
μE ∈ME(qE), we have ϕR((qR, RR), μE) ∈MR(qR, μE). Let ϕ¯R denote the
set of all matching rules in the regular decision period.
A matching rule ϕE in the early decision period is stable if ϕE(qE, RE) ∈
SE(qE, RE) for all (qE, RE) ∈ EE.
A matching rule ϕR in the regular decision period is stable at an early de-
cision matching rule ϕE if ϕR((qR, RR), ϕE(qE, RE)) ∈ SR((qR, RR), ϕE(qE,
RE)) for all (qR, RR) ∈ ER, for all qE ∈ QE(qR), and for allRE ∈Qk∈C∪SREk (
RRk , q
E).
15To find the college-optimal and student-optimal stable matchings in the two deci-
sion periods, we respectively use the well-known college-proposing and student-proposing
deferred acceptance algorithms by Gale and Shapley (1962).
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For any ϕE ∈ ϕ¯E that is used in the early decision period and for any
ϕR ∈ ϕ¯R that is used in the regular decision period, the ordered pair (ϕE, ϕR)
is called a matching system. Let ϕ denote the matching system (ϕE, ϕR).
A matching system ϕ is stable if (i) ϕE is stable, and (ii) ϕR is stable at
ϕE.
Let ϕC be a matching system such that ϕEC(q
E, RE) = μEC(q
E, RE) and
ϕRC((q
R, RR), ϕEC(q
E, RE)) = μRC((q
R, RR), μEC(q
E, RE)) for all qE ∈ QE(qR)
and for all RE ∈
Q
k∈C∪SREk (RRk , qE). We call ϕC as the college-optimal
stable matching system.
Let ϕS be such that ϕES (q
E, RE) = μES (q
E, RE) and ϕRS ((q
R, RR), ϕES (q
E,
RE)) = μRS ((q
R, RR), μES (q
E, RE)) for all qE ∈ QE(qR) and for all RE ∈Q
k∈C∪SREk (RRk , qE). We call ϕS as the student-optimal stable matching
system.
3 Manipulation via Preferences and Quotas
Amatching system ϕ is nonmanipulable by agent k ∈ C∪S via early decision
preferences if
ϕR((qR, RR), ϕE(qE, RE))(k) RRk ϕ
R((qR, RR), ϕE(qE, RˆEk , R
E
−k))(k)
for all (qR, RR) ∈ ER, for all qE ∈ QE(qR), for all RE ∈Qi∈C∪SREi (RRi , qE),
and for all RˆEk ∈ REk (RRk , qE).
Let K(ϕ) denote the set of all agents in C ∪ S by every of which ϕ is
nonmanipulable via early decision preferences. A matching system ϕ is (in-
dividually) nonmanipulable by colleges via early decision preferences if K(ϕ)
⊇ C. Likewise, a matching system ϕ is (individually) nonmanipulable by
students via early decision preferences if K(ϕ) ⊇ S. A matching system ϕ is
(individually) nonmanipulable via early decision preferences if K(ϕ) = C∪S.
A matching system ϕ is nonmanipulable by college c ∈ C via early decision
quotas if
ϕR((qR, RR), ϕE(qE, RE))(c) RRc ϕ
R((qR, RR), ϕE(qˆEc , q
E
−c, R
E))(c)
for all (qR, RR) ∈ ER, for all qE ∈ QE(qR), for all RE ∈ RE(RR, qE),
and for all qˆEc ∈ QEc (qR). A matching system is (individually) nonmanip-
ulable via early decision quotas if it is nonmanipulable by any college via
early decision quotas.
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Finally, a matching system is (individually) nonmanipulable if it is (in-
dividually) nonmanipulable via early decision preferences and (individually)
nonmanipulable via early decision quotas.
Theorem 1. Suppose there are at least two colleges and one student. Then
there exists no matching system that is stable and nonmanipulable by colleges
via early decision quotas.
The above result is no longer true when there exists a unique college in the
market. It is known by Roth (1985) that in a single-stage decision process, for
each matching market there exists a unique stable matching which is college-
optimal, i.e. a matching that assigns to each college the highest ranked
achievable students allowed by its quota. Since the preferences of students
are participatory, every student that is achievable in the regular decision
period will apply early to the single college in the market if it reports its
total capacity and adopts its regular decision preference in the early decision
period. Hence, in our two-stage matching model, manipulating the quota in
the early decision can make for a college no diﬀerence except for the timing
of the admission of some students already achievable in the regular decision.
Below, we consider whether colleges have incentives to manipulate their
preferences in the early decision period.
Theorem 2. Suppose there are at least two colleges and two students. Then
there exists no matching system that is stable and nonmanipulable by colleges
via early decision preferences.
One can also claim that the proposition in Theorem 2 remains to hold
when the number of students in the market is one. For example, when
C = {c1, c2}, S = {s1}, qRc1 = 1, qRc2 = 1, qEc1 = 1, qEc2 = 0,
PRc1 = {s1}, ∅,
PEc1 = ∅,
PˆEc1 = P
R
c1 ,
PRc2 = P
E
c2 = {s1}, ∅,
PRs1 = {c2}, {c1}, ∅,
PEs1 = {c1}, ∅,
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we have SE(qE, RE) = {μ1}, SR(qR, RR, μ1) = {μ2}, SE(qE, RˆEc1 , RE−c1) ={μ3}, SR(qR, RR, μ3) = {μ3}, where
μ1 =
µ
c1 c2
∅ ∅
¶
, μ2 =
µ
c1 c2
∅ {s1}
¶
, μ3 =
µ
c1 c2
{s1} ∅
¶
.
Therefore, ϕE(qE, RE) = μ1, ϕR((qR, RR), μ1) = μ2, ϕE(qE, RˆEc1 , R
E
−c1) = μ3,
and ϕR((qR, RR), μ3) = μ3. Hence,
ϕR((qR, RR), ϕE(qE, RˆEc1 , R
E
−c1))(c1) P
R
c1 ϕ
R((qR, RR), ϕE(qE, RE))(c1).
That is, college c1 can manipulate the matching system (ϕE, ϕR) via early
decision preferences, completing the proof for the case of two colleges and
one student. Finally, we can include colleges whose top choice is admitting
no student in both the early decision period and the regular decision period
to generalize this proof to cases with one student and at least two colleges.
However, we should remark in this setup that in a matching market involving
a single student, the unacceptability of the student in the early decision
period for any college who indeed considers him or her acceptable under its
regular decision preference is not ‘rational’ at all, though admissible, to be
assumed in the first place.
On the other hand, we would no longer have the negative result in The-
orem 2 when there exists only one college in the market. Manipulation via
early decision preferences, like the previously studied manipulation via early
decision quotas, can in this case aﬀect only the timing of the admission of
some students already achievable in the regular decision.
Theorem 3. Suppose there are at least two colleges and one student. Then
there exists no matching system that is stable and nonmanipulable by stu-
dents via early decision preferences.
When there is a unique college in the market, under participatory pref-
erences every student that is achievable in the regular decision period will
apply early to this college if it admits students early. Hence, the only case
a student can manipulate his or her preference ordering in the early decision
period arises when the college does not accept students early, which is obvi-
ously immaterial for the student.
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Theorem 4. Suppose there are at least two colleges and two students. Then
there exists no matching system that is stable and nonmanipulable.
In the following section, we will study the strategic incentives of colleges
in an early decision quota game.
4 Early Decision Quota Game
We consider an early decision quota game played by colleges for a given regu-
lar decision market (C,S,RR, qR), where RR and qR are commonly known.16
Each college is asked to announce out of its total capacity an early deci-
sion quota, i.e. the strategy of college c is qEc ∈ QEc (qR). We assume that
for each possible announcement of the vector qE, the preferences of colleges
and students in the early decision period, denoted by RE(qE), is also com-
mon knowledge. Suppose that a matching system ϕ is used to determine
the matchings in the early decision market and the regular decison market.
College c’s pereferences over reported early decision quotas are represented
by a binary relationship ºϕc over QE(qR) such that for all q0E, q00E ∈ QE(qR)
we have q0E ºϕc q00E if and only if
ϕR((qR, RR), ϕE(q0E, RE(q0E)))RRc ϕ
R((qR, RR), ϕE(q00E, RE(q00E))).
An early decision quota reporting game under matching system ϕ is described
by a strategic form game (C, (QEc (qR),ºϕc )c∈C).
Define college c’s best response correspondence under matching system ϕ
by βϕc : QE−c(qR)→ QEc (qR) such that for any qE−c ∈ QE−c(qR),
βϕc (q
E
−c) = {q˜Ec ∈ QEc (qR) : (q˜Ec , qE−c)ºϕc (q0Ec , qE−c) for all q0Ec ∈ QEc (qR)}.
A pure strategy (Nash) equilibrium of the game (C, (QEc (qR),ºϕc )c∈C) is a
strategy profile qE ∈ QE(qR) such that qEc ∈ βϕc (qE−c) for all c ∈ C.
The following two theorems respectively show that a pure strategy equilib-
rium may not exist under the college-optimal and student-optimal matching
systems.
16A similar game in a single-shot hospital-intern market is considered by Konishi and
Ünver (2006).
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Theorem 5. The early decision quota reporting game under the college-
optimal matching system may not have a pure strategy equilbrium.
Theorem 6. The early decision quota reporting game under the student-
optimal matching system may not have a pure strategy equilibrium.
Konishi and Ünver (2006) have a similar pair of results showing the nonex-
istence of a pure strategy equilibrium of the game of capacity manipulation
in a single-period hospital-intern market. They argue that hospitals can im-
prove their position by restricting the available capacity under the hospital-
optimal matching rule. The reason is that larger capacities of hospitals make
interns better oﬀ by giving them more alternatives to choose from. How-
ever, when capacities are limited, an intern cannot play one oﬀer against the
other and has to choose among rather limited set of oﬀers which may not
include his/her favorite hospital. Konishi and Ünver (2006) also remark that
hospitals, which are getting their least preferable acceptable interns under
the intern-optimal matching rule, can do better by swapping interns through
some reduction in their quotas. In our model, similar incentives are at work.
However, given the fixed total capacity in the regular decision period, col-
leges are able to improve their position not by limiting the total number of
incoming students but by spreading admissions process across periods. This
essentially increases their “bargaining power” without necessarily reducing
the overall intake of the students. If we use the analogy between the college
admissions market and the marriage market remarked by Roth (1985) by
viewing each vacant position in a college as an individual player who has
the same preferences as the college that it belongs to, spreading admissions
across periods increases the bargaining power of a college by making the
supply side of the market “thinner”. Obviously whether this strategy will al-
ways improve the position of colleges depends on the preferences of students
adopted in the early decision market.
Another interesting finding of Konishi and Ünver (2006) is that a hos-
pital’s capacity underreport makes all other hospitals weakly better oﬀ and
all interns weakly worse oﬀ. But, this observation does not carry over our
framework that involves two stages of admissions. It is apparent from the
examples exhibited in Theorems 5 and 6 that in the early decision quota
reporting game, a college’s quota report does not have a monotonous eﬀect
on the welfare of the other colleges and students under college-optimal and
student-optimal matching systems. For example in Table 2 in the Appen-
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dix, if c1 reduces its early decision quota at qE = (3, 0), c2 is first worse
oﬀ ({s3, s5}PRc2{s2, s3}) then better oﬀ ({s1, s2, s3}PRc2{s2, s3}). Similarly, in
Table 4, if c1 decreases its early decision quota at qE = (3, 1), c2 is first worse
oﬀ ({s4, s5}PRc2{s3, s5}) then better oﬀ ({s2, s3, s5}PRc2{s3, s5}). In terms of
students’ welfare, we observe that in Table 2, if c1 reduces its early decision
quota at qE = (3, 1), not all sudents become weakly worse oﬀ. While s1 is
better oﬀ, s2 is initially better oﬀ as c1 gradually reduces its quota from 3
to 1 but then worse oﬀ. Similiarly, in Table 4, if c1 reduces its early decision
quota at qE = (3, 1), not all students become weakly worse oﬀ. While s1 is
better oﬀ, s2 is worse oﬀ.
Given the nonexistence results in Theorems 5 and 6 under the full domain
of preferences, we will now consider certain restrictions on preferences to
guarantee the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Dealing with a similar
problem in a single-stage hospital-intern market, Konishi and Ünver (2006)
consider two types of restrictions. In one of them, hospitals’ preferences
satisfy strong monotonicity in population, if and only if any hospital strictly
prefers among any two groups of acceptable interns of distinct sizes the one
that is more populated. With this domain restriction, Konishi and Ünver
(2006) show that in the capacity-reporting game, under the hospital-optimal
matching rule reporting the number of interns that the matching rule assigns
is an equilibrium strategy whereas under the intern-optimal matching rule
reporting the actual capacity is a weakly dominant strategy. In our model,
we say that colleges’ preferences R ∈ RE ∪RR satisfy strong monotonicity
in population, if and only if for any c ∈ C and for any S0, S 00 ⊆ A(Rc), we
have |S0| > |S00|⇒ S0PcS 00. We should immediately note that the preferences
of colleges in the market examples considered in the proofs of Theorems 5
and 6 already satisfy strong monotonicity in population. Thus, this type of
restriction does not seem to be promising for our purpose.
The second type of restriction that Konishi and Ünver (2006) consider is
the common preferences for one group over the agents of the opposite group.
With such preferences, they are able to show that reporting the true capacity
is always a weakly dominant strategy. Below, we will show that this kind of
domain restriction will also allow us to achieve a set of interesting existence
results.
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4.1 Common Preferences for Colleges
A preference profile R ∈ RE ∪RR satisfies common preferences for colleges
over individual students if and only if for any c, c0 ∈ C and for any s, s0 ∈ S
we have {s}Pc {s0}⇔ {s}Pc0 {s0}.17
Let RR−CC ⊂ RR and RE−CC ⊂ RE be the domains of such profiles
of common preference relations in the regular decision period and the early
decision period, respectively.
Now, pick qR ∈ Nn+, qE ∈ QE(qR), RR ∈ RR−CC , and RE ∈ RE(RR, qE)∩
RE−CC . Rename and reorder acceptable students by the preference ordering
PEc of college c as s1, s2, ..., slE(c). That is, college c has the preference ordering
PEc = {s1}, {s2}, ..., {slE(c)}, ∅.
With an abuse of notation, assume that PEc = ∅ corresponds to lE(c) = 0.
Let lˆE = max{lE(c) : c ∈ C}. Define ChEs (REs , C 0) be the acceptable college,
if any, in C 0 ⊆ C for student s with respect to the preference relation REs ,
i.e., ChEs (REs , C 0) = C 0 ∩ A(REs ). If lˆE > 0, consider a matching μˆE in the
early decision period generated by the following serial-dictatorship:18
Step 1: Let CE,1 = {c ∈ C : qEc 6= 0 and s1 ∈ A(REc )} and qE,1c = qEc for all
c ∈ C. Set μˆE(s1) = ChEs1(REs1, CE,1).
. .. .. .
Step t: For all c ∈ C, let qE,tc = qE,t−1c −1 if μˆE(st−1) = {c}, and qE,tc = qE,t−1c
otherwise. Let CE,t = {c ∈ C : qE,tc 6= 0 and st ∈ A(REc )}. Set μˆE(st) =
ChEst(R
E
st, C
E,t).
The above algorithm stops after lˆE steps, and μˆE becomes the matching
of the early decision market. Notice that for all s ∈ S\{s1, s2, ..., slˆE}, we
have μˆE(s) = ∅, trivially. If lˆE = 0, set μˆE(s) = ∅ for all s ∈ S.
17This definition of common preferences for colleges as well as the definition of common
preferences for students given in the next subsection slightly weaken a pair of definitions in
Konishi and Ünver (2006) who require also a common set of acceptable students (colleges)
under the common preferences for colleges (students).
18The serial dictatorship rules that we use throughout the paper extend those in Konishi
and Ünver (2006) to our two-stage framework. For the other uses of serial dictatorship
in one-sided matching markets, see Svensson (1994), Abdulkadirog˜lu and Sönmez (1998),
and Papai (2000).
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Now, we consider a similar matching in the regular decision period. Re-
name and reorder acceptable students by the preference ordering PRc of col-
lege c as s1, s2, ..., slR(c). That is, college c has the preference ordering
PRc = {s1}, {s2}, ..., {slR(c)}, ∅.
Assume that PRc = ∅ corresponds to lR(c) = 0. Let lˆR = max{lR(c) : c ∈ C}.
Define ChRs (RRs , C 0) be the most preferable acceptable college in C 0 ⊆ C for
student s with respect to the preference relation RRs , i.e., ChEs (RRs , C 0) =
{c ∈ C 0 ∩ A(RRs ) : {c}RRs {c0} for any c0 ∈ C 0}. Given the matching μˆE,
consider a matching μˆR in the regular decision period, generated by the fol-
lowing serial-dictatorship if lˆR > 0:
Step 1: Let qR,1c (μˆ
E) = qRc − |μˆE(c)| for all c ∈ C, and CR,1(μˆE) = {c ∈
C : qR,1c (μˆ
E) 6= 0 and s1 ∈ A(RRc )}. Set μˆR(s1) = ChRs1(RRs1, CR,1(μˆE)) if
μˆE(s1) = ∅, and μˆR(s1) = μˆE(s1) otherwise.
. .. .. .
Step t: For all c ∈ C, let qR,tc (μˆE) = qR,t−1c (μˆE)−1 if μˆR(st−1)\μˆE(st−1) = {c},
and qR,tc (μˆ
E) = qR,t−1c (μˆ
E) otherwise. Let CR,t(μˆE) = {c ∈ C : qR,tc (μˆE) 6=
0 and st ∈ A(REc )}. Set μˆR(st) = ChRst(RRst, CR,t(μˆE)) if μˆE(st) = ∅, and
μˆR(st) = μˆE(st) otherwise.
The above algorithm stops after lˆR steps, and μˆR becomes the matching
of the regular decision market. Notice that for all s ∈ S\{s1, s2, ..., slˆR}, we
have μˆR(s) = μˆE(s) = ∅, trivially. If lˆR = 0, set μˆR(s) = μˆE(s) = ∅ for all
s ∈ S.
Lemma 1. Consider any college admissions market with common prefer-
ences for colleges in both periods. Then (μˆE, μˆR) is the unique pair of stable
matchings in the early and regular decision periods.
Early decision program requires every student to apply early only to at
most one college and to commit himself or herself to that college in case of an
acceptance. It is interesting to find that under this program, ‘accepting no
student early’ becomes a weakly dominant strategy if colleges have common
preferences and every student, choosing to act early, applies to his or her
20
top-ranked college.
Theorem 7. Consider a regular decision market with common preferences
for colleges. Assume that at all possible announcements of the quota profile
colleges adopt their regular preferences in the early decision market and each
student, choosing to act under early decision, applies early to the top-ranked
college under his or her regular preference ordering. Then, in the early deci-
sion quota game under the stable matching system, reporting zero quota is a
weakly dominant strategy for each college.
The above theorem assumes that any college can be matched in the early
decision period only with students that rank it at the top in their preference
orderings. However, any such student, if not already in the list of students
that this particular college accepts in the regular decision period when it
announces zero quota for the early decision period, must be undesirable for
the college since the matchings are determined by the serial dictatorship of
students under the common preferences for colleges. Hence, it is true for each
college that reporting the early decision quota as zero is a weakly dominant
strategy. The below example highlights our reasoning why a college can be-
come worse oﬀ by setting a positive early-decision quota.
Example 1. Consider the regular decision market (C, S, qR, RR) with C =
{c1, c2}, S = {s1, s2, s3}, qRc1 = 1, qRc2 = 1, and the following preference profile
for colleges and students:
PRc1 = P
R
c2 = {s1}, {s2}, {s3}, ∅,
PRs1 = P
R
s2 = {c1}, {c2}, ∅,
PRs3 = {c2}, {c1}, ∅.
We have QEc (qR) = {0, 1} for all c ∈ C. Let PEc1 (qE) = PEc2 (qE) = PRc1 for all
qE ∈ QEc (qR), and let PEs (qE) = {Top(RRs ; 1)}, ∅ for all qE ∈ QEc (qR) and for
all s ∈ S. Pick any qEc1 ∈ QEc (qR). We have ϕˆE((qEc1 , 0), RE(qEc1, 0))(c2) =
∅, and ϕˆR(((1, 1), RR), ϕˆE((qEc1, 0), RE(qEc1 , 0)))(c2) = {s2}. On the other
hand, when c2 reports its total capacity and the early decision quota pro-
file changes to (qEc1 , 1), we have ϕˆ
R(((1, 1), RR), ϕˆE((qEc1 , 1), R
E(qEc1, 1)))(c2) =
ϕˆE((qEc1, 1), R
E(qEc1 , 1))(c2) = {s3}. Since (qEc1 , 0)º
ˆϕ
c2 (q
E
c1 , 1), college c2 be-
comes worse oﬀ by not setting its early decision quota as zero.
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Restricting each student to apply early to his or her top-ranked college
only when there is at most one college in the early decision market, we obtain
the prospect of unparticipating in the early decision market as an equilibrium
strategy for colleges, which is stated by the following corollary to Theorem
7.
Corollary 1. Consider a regular decision market with common preferences
for colleges. Assume that colleges adopt their regular preferences in the early
decision market, and each student, choosing to act under early decision, ap-
plies early only to the top-ranked college under his or her regular preference
ordering when there is at most one college in the early decision market. Then,
every college’s reporting zero quota is a Nash equilibrium of the early decision
quota game under the stable matching system.
The assumed early-decision preferences of students driving the above re-
sults are in line with the constant recommendation of the College Board,
many college guides, and counsellars that students should apply under early
decision only to a clear-cut first-choice college. The actual response of stu-
dents to this recommendation is highlighted by the survey reported in Avery
et.al. (2003). According to this survey, which is conducted during 1997-2000,
98 percent of a total of 48 sample students applied to an early decision pro-
gram, as a ‘strong or weak first choice’, at either Princeton, Yale or Wesleyan.
However, it is, of course, a possibility that a student who wants to enjoy
his or her senior year in the highschool without any pressure may instead
be applying early to a college that is not his or her top choice, while at the
same time easier to be admitted. Such compromising behaviour of students
makes more sense in real-life situations where the applicant pool is very large
and the information about the true preference profile as well as the matching
process is not completely available to all applicants.
Interestingly, the existence of compromising students in the applicant
pool explains why some lower-ranked colleges may not agree to terminate
the single-choice early decision programs. For instance, a college that is con-
sidered to be low-ranked by almost all students in the regular decision period
and nonetheless highly preferred in the early decision period by some compro-
mising students who are high-ranked under the common regular preferences
of colleges, may agressively enter the early decision market. The below ex-
ample elaborates this idea.
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Example 2. Consider the regular decision market (C,S, qR, RR) with
C = {c1, c2}, S = {s1, s2, s3}, qRc1 = 2, qRc2 = 2, and the following regular
preferences for colleges and students:
PRc1 = P
R
c2 = {s1}, {s2}, {s3}, ∅,
PRs1 = P
R
s2 = {c1}, {c2}, ∅,
PRs3 = {c2}, {c1}, ∅.
We have QEc (qR) = {0, 1, 2} for all c ∈ C. Let PEc = PRc for all c ∈ C.
Also, let PEs (qE) = {Top(RRs ; 1)}, ∅ for all s ∈ {s1, s3} and PEs2(qE) ={Top(RRs2; 2)}, ∅ for all qE ∈ QE(qR).
We will show that the early decision quota profile (0, 0) is no longer a
Nash equilibrium. We have ϕˆE((0, 0), RE(0, 0))(c2) = ∅, and ϕˆR(((2, 2), RR),
ϕˆE((0, 0), RE(0, 0)))(c2) = {s3}. College c2, which is the lowest-ranked
college by the majority of students, has an incentive to enter the early
decision market, since if it unilaterally deviates and announces qEc2 = 2,
we have ϕˆR(((2, 2), RR), ϕˆE((0, 2), RE(0, 2)))(c2) = ϕˆE((0, 2), RE(0, 2))(c2)
= {s2, s3}. Thus, it is not true that (0, 0)ºˆϕc2 (0, 2). Here, one can easily
check that the Nash equilibria of this game are (0, 1), (1, 1), (2, 1), (0, 2),
(1, 2), and (2, 2), which all yield the same matching outcome in the regular
decision period.
4.2 Common Preferences for Students
A preference profile R ∈ RE ∪RR satisfies common preferences for students
over individual colleges if and only if for any s, s0 ∈ S and for any c, c0 ∈ C
we have {c}Ps {c0}⇔ {c}Ps0 {c0}.
Let RR−CS ⊂ RR and RE−CS ⊂ RE be the domains of such profiles
of common preference relations in the regular decision period and the early
decision period, respectively.
Now, pick qR ∈ Nn+, qE ∈ QE(qR), RR ∈ RR−CS, and RE ∈ RE(RR, qE)∩
RE−CS. Define SE(RE) = {s ∈ S : A(REs ) 6= ∅}. Rename the acceptable
college by the preference ordering PEs of student s ∈ SE(RE) as c1; i.e.,
PEs = {c1}, ∅.
If SE(RE) 6= ∅, consider a matching μ˜E in the early decision period, gener-
ated by the following serial-dictatorship:
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Single Step: Set μ˜E(c1) = ChEc1(R
E
c1 , q
E
c1, S
E(RE)).
Notice that for all c ∈ C\{c1}, we have μ˜E(c) = ∅, trivially. If SE(RE) =
∅, set μ˜E(c) = ∅ for all c ∈ C.
Now, we consider a similar matching in the regular decision period. Re-
name and reorder acceptable colleges by the preference ordering PRs of stu-
dent s as c1, c2, ..., clR(s). That is, student s has the preference ordering
PRs = {c1}, {c2}, ..., {clR(s)}, ∅.
With an abuse of notation, assume that PRs = ∅ corresponds to lR(s) = 0. Let
l˜R = max{lR(s) : s ∈ S}. Given the matching μ˜E, consider a matching μ˜R
in the regular decision period generated by the following serial-dictatorship
if l˜R > 0:
Step 1: Let SR,1(qE, qR) = {s ∈ S\∪l˜Eτ=1 μ˜E(cτ) : c1 ∈ A(REs )}. Set μ˜R(c1) =
μ˜E(c1) ∪ ChRc1(RRc1 , qR,1c1 , μ˜
E, SR,1(qE, qR)).
. .. .. .
Step t: Let SR,t(qE, qR) = {s ∈ S\
³¡
∪t−1τ=1 μ˜R(cτ )
¢
∪
³
∪l˜Eτ=t μ˜E(cτ)
´´
: ct ∈
A(RRs )}. Set μ˜R(ct) = μ˜E(ct) ∪ ChRct(RRct, qR,tct , μ˜E, SR,t(qE, qR)).
The above algorithm stops after l˜R steps, and μ˜R becomes the matching
of the regular decision market. Notice that for all c ∈ C\{c1, c2, ..., cl˜R}, we
have μ˜R(c) = μ˜E(c) = ∅. If l˜R = 0, set μ˜R(c) = μ˜E(c) = ∅ for all c ∈ C.
Lemma 2. Consider any college admissions market with common prefer-
ences for students in both periods. Then (μ˜E, μ˜R) is the unique pair of stable
matchings in the early and regular decision periods.
We will below show that any feasible quota profile becomes an equilibrium
strategy if students have common preferences over the individual colleges and
each student, choosing to act under early decision, applies to his or her top-
ranked college irrespective of the quota announcements. As the matchings
are determined by the serial dictatorship of colleges, no college except for the
top-ranked one with respect to the common preferences of students can ever
accept any student in the early decision period. Given this fact, it should
also be clear that the top-ranked college becomes completely impartial to
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any early quota decision, since it is already the first in selecting students in
the regular decision period.
Theorem 8. Consider a regular decision market with common preferences
for students. Assume that at all possible announcements of the quota profile,
each student, choosing to act under early decision, applies early only to the
top-ranked college under his or her regular preference ordering. Then, any
feasible quota profile is a Nash equilibrium of the early decision quota game
under the stable matching system.
Since colleges in the above result are completely indiﬀerent over all fea-
sible early decision quota profiles, we can safely assume that they may just
consider to terminate their early decision plans as a weakly dominant strat-
egy.
Like in Corollary 1, we can now restrict each student in the early decision
program to apply to his or her top-ranked college only when there exists at
most one college in the early decision market. The below corollary to Theo-
rem 8 thus obtains reporting no quota as an equilibrium strategy.
Corollary 2. Consider a regular decision market with common preferences
for students. Assume that each student, choosing to act under early decision,
applies early only to the top-ranked college under his or her regular prefer-
ence ordering when there is at most one college in the early decision market.
Then, every college’s reporting zero quota is a Nash equilibrium of the early
decision quota game under the stable matching system.
Finally, we relax the restriction on students’ preferences that gives rise
to the above pair of results. When the single choice of some students in
the early decision market does not coincide with the top-ranked college un-
der their common regular preference ordering, some colleges may have an
incentive to oﬀer an early decision program in order to admit some students
compromising in the early stage of the matching process. This observation
is highlighted by the following simple example.
Example 3. Consider the regular decision market (C,S, qR, RR) with
C = {c1, c2}, S = {s1, s2, s3}, qRc1 = 2, qRc2 = 2, and the following regular
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preferences for colleges and students:
PRc1 = {s1}, {s2}, {s3}, ∅,
PRc2 = {s3}, {s2}, {s1}, ∅,
PRs = {c1}, {c2}, ∅, for all s ∈ S.
We have QEc (qR) = {0, 1, 2} for all c ∈ C. Let PEc (qE) = PRc for all c ∈ C,
and PEs (qE) = {Top(RRs ; 2)}, ∅ for all s ∈ S and for all qE ∈ QE(qR). (Here,
we have kept on assuming common early decision preferences for compro-
mising students to simply obtain the unique stable matching by the serial
dictatorship of colleges.)
We will show that the early decision quota profile (0, 0) is no longer a
Nash equilibrium. We have ϕˆE((0, 0), RE(0, 0))(c2) = ∅, and ϕˆR(((2, 2), RR),
ϕˆE((0, 0), RE(0, 0)))(c2) = {s3}. College c2, which is the lowest-ranked col-
lege by all students, has an incentive to enter the early decision market,
since if it unilaterally deviates and announces qEc2 = 2, it can select the set of
students ϕˆR(((2, 2), RR), ϕˆE((0, 2), RE(0, 2)))(c2) = ϕˆE((0, 2), RE(0, 2))(c2)
= {s2, s3}. Thus, it is not true that (0, 0)ºˆϕc2 (0, 2). Here, one can easily
check that the Nash equilibria of this game are (0, 2), (1, 2), and (2, 2), which
all yield the same matching outcome in the regular decision period.
5 Conclusions
Harvard College’s recent announcement of eliminating its early action pro-
gram brought the prospect of abolition of all early admissions programs in
the United States under scrutiny. The main argument underlying Harvard’s
decison was that early admissions programs favor already advantaged stu-
dents with high income and thus hurt low-income students who generally
prefer to wait until regular admissions where they can apply to and com-
pare diﬀerent financial aid packages. Princeton University and University of
Virginia who had both used to oﬀer early decision programs immediately fol-
lowed the suit, sharing the concerns of Harvard. However, some colleges and
universities that oﬀer early action programs argued that it is not clear how
elimination of non-binding early admissions programs such as early action
will result in admission of more low-income students, as voiced by Richard
Levin, the President of Yale University.19
19See http://www.yale.edu/opa/president/statements/20060912.html.
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Many institutions, in fact, have strong incentives to continue their early
admissions programs. As argued by Avery et.al. (2003) it is unlikely that
the conduct of Harvard will be followed by liberal arts colleges that rely on
early decision much more than larger universities because small miscalcu-
lations about class size can have much more serious consequences than at
larger institutions.20 Another reason why some colleges and universities are
reluctant to switch back to single-date admissions programs is that they can
manipulate by means of early decision programs the admission and matricu-
lation rates, which in turn determine the rankings of these institutions that
students take into account when applying.21
Among several rationales behind the adoption of early admissions pro-
grams, our paper tackles one involved in the intertemporal quota allocation
problem. To this aim, we have modeled college admissions under early de-
cision in a two-period many-to-one matching framework. Our first set of
results show that every stable matching system is vulnerable to manipula-
tion by students and colleges via early decision preferences and by colleges
via early decision quotas. Next, we have considered an early decision quota
game to be played by colleges and studied its equilibria. We have established
that a pure strategy equilibrium of this game may not exist. However, when
colleges or students have common preferences over the other set of agents, we
have found that ‘terminating early decision plan’ can become a weakly dom-
inant strategy (or an equilibrium strategy) for every college if each student,
choosing to act under early decision, applies to his or her first choice college,
as strongly recommended by the College Board, many college guides, college
admission oﬃcers, and counsellars. This result is overwhelmingly striking in
that the raison d’être of the system ceases to exist if students behave ac-
cording to the presciptions of the designers or executers of the early decision
system.
However, we have also showed that some colleges may have incentives
to oﬀer early decision plans when some students compromise under early
decision. Moreover, the dynamic nature of our model uncovered the instru-
mental role played by early decision programs in increasing the bargaining
power of colleges (vis à vis students) by making the supply side of the market
“thinner”.
We believe that our model can be extended in several dimensions to cap-
20See page 274 of Avery et.al. (2003).
21See Avery et.al. (2004).
27
ture the other raised concerns about and motives for early admissions pro-
grams. In this regard, future research may profitably study the early decision
and early action programs in comparison, taking into consideration the is-
sues of fairness and manipulability of rankings as well as the manipulability
of quotas, capacities and preferences.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. We first prove the theorem for two colleges and one
student. Let the matching system (ϕE, ϕR) ∈ ϕ¯E×ϕ¯R be stable, C = {c1, c2},
S = {s1}, qRc1 = 1, qRc2 = 1, qEc1 = 0, qEc2 = 0, qˆEc1 = 1,
PRc1 = P
E
c1 = {s1}, ∅,
PRc2 = P
E
c2 = {s1}, ∅,
PRs1 = {c2}, {c1}, ∅,
PEs1 = {c1}, ∅.
We have SE(qE, RE) = {μ1}, SR(qR, RR, μ1) = {μ2}, SE(qˆEc1 , qEc2, RE) ={μ3}, and SR(qR, RR, μ2) = {μ3}, where
μ1 =
µ
c1 c2
∅ ∅
¶
, μ2 =
µ
c1 c2
∅ {s1}
¶
, μ3 =
µ
c1 c2
{s1} ∅
¶
.
Therefore, ϕE(qE, RE) = μ1, ϕR((qR, RR), μ1) = μ2, ϕE(qˆEc1 , q
E
c2, R
E) = μ3,
and ϕR((qR, RR), μ2) = μ3. Hence,
ϕR((qR, RR), ϕE(qˆEc1, q
E
c2 , R
E))(c1) PRc1 ϕ
R((qR, RR), ϕE(qE, RE))(c1).
That is, college c1 can manipulate the matching system (ϕE, ϕR) via early
decision quotas when its quota in the early decision is qEc1 = 0, by accepting
student compromising in the early decision with the announcement qˆEc1 = 1.
This completes the proof for the case of two colleges and one student. Fi-
nally, we can include colleges whose top choice is admitting no student and
students whose top choice is staying unassigned in both the early decision
period and the regular decision period to generalize this proof to cases with
at least two colleges and one student.
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Proof of Theorem 2. We first prove the theorem for two colleges and
two students. Let the matching system (ϕE, ϕR) ∈ ϕ¯E × ϕ¯R be stable,
C = {c1, c2}, S = {s1, s2}, qRc1 = 1, qRc2 = 2, qEc1 = 1, qEc2 = 0,
PRc1 = {s1}, {s2}, ∅,
PEc1 = {s1}, ∅,
PRc2 = P
E
c2 = {s1}, {s2}, ∅,
PˆEc1 = P
R
c1 ,
PRs1 = {c2}, {c1}, ∅,
PEs1 = ∅,
PRs2 = {c2}, {c1}, ∅,
PEs2 = {c1}, ∅.
We have SE(qE, RE) = {μ1}, SR(qR, RR, μ1) = {μ2}, SE(qE, RˆEc1 , RE−c1) ={μ3}, SR(qR, RR, μ3) = {μ4} where
μ1 =
µ
c1 c2
∅ ∅
¶
, μ2 =
µ
c1 c2
∅ {s1, s2}
¶
,
μ3 =
µ
c1 c2
{s2} ∅
¶
, μ4 =
µ
c1 c2
{s2} {s1}
¶
.
Therefore, ϕE(qE, RE) = μ1, ϕR((qR, RR), μ1) = μ2, ϕE(qE, RˆEc1 , R
E
−c1) = μ3,
and ϕR((qR, RR), μ3) = μ4. Hence,
ϕR((qR, RR), ϕE(qE, RˆEc1 , R
E
−c1))(c1) P
R
c1 ϕ
R((qR, RR), ϕE(qE, RE))(c1).
That is, college c1 can manipulate the matching system (ϕE, ϕR) via early
decision preferences, completing the proof for the case of two colleges and
two students. Finally, we can include colleges whose top choice is admitting
no student and students whose top choice is staying unassigned in both the
early decision period and the regular decision period to generalize this proof
to cases with at least two colleges and two students.
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Proof of Theorem 3. We first prove the theorem for two colleges and one
student. Let the matching system (ϕE, ϕR) ∈ ϕ¯E×ϕ¯R be stable, C = {c1, c2},
S = {s1}, qRc1 = 1, qRc2 = 1, qEc1 = 0, qEc2 = 1,
PRc1 = P
E
c1 = {s1}, ∅,
PRc2 = P
E
c2 = {s1}, ∅,
PRs1 = {c1}, {c2}, ∅,
PEs1 = {c2}, ∅,
PˆEs1 = {c1}, ∅.
We have SE(qE, RE) = {μ1}, SR(qR, RR, μ1) = {μ1}, SE(qE, RˆEs1 , RE−s1) ={μ2}, and SR(qR, RR, μ2) = {μ3}, where
μ1 =
µ
c1 c2
∅ {s1}
¶
, μ2 =
µ
c1 c2
∅ ∅
¶
, μ3 =
µ
c1 c2
{s1} ∅
¶
.
Therefore, ϕE(qE, RE) = μ1, ϕR((qR, RR), μ1) = μ1, ϕE(qE, RˆEs1 , R
E
−s1) = μ2,
and ϕR((qR, RR), μ2) = μ3. Hence,
ϕR((qR, RR), ϕE(qE, RˆRs1 , R
E
−s1))(s1) P
R
s1 ϕ
R((qR, RR), ϕE(qE, RE))(s1).
That is, student s1 can manipulate the matching system (ϕE, ϕR) via early
decision preferences, completing the proof for the case of two colleges and
one student. Finally, we can include colleges whose top choice is admitting
no student and students whose top choice is staying unassigned in both the
early decision period and the regular decision period to generalize this proof
to cases with at least two colleges and one student.
Proof of Theorem 4. A direct corollary to Theorems 1-3.
Proof of Theorem 5. Consider the regular decision market (C,S, qR, RR)
with C = {c1, c2}, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}, qRc1 = 3, qRc2 = 3, and
PRc1 = {s1}, {s2}, {s4}, {s3}, {s5}, ∅,
PRc2 = {s4}, {s5}, {s1}, {s3}, {s2}, ∅,
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with S0PRc S
00
for any c ∈ C and for any S0, S00 ⊆ S such that |S0| > |S 00|,
PRs = {c2}, {c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s2, s3},
PRs = {c1}, {c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s4, s5}.
We have QEc (qR) = {0, 1, 2, 3} for all c ∈ C. Let PEc (qE) = PRc for all
qE ∈ QE(qR) and for all c ∈ C.
Moreover, let PEs ((0, 0)) = ∅ for s ∈ S, PEs4((0, 1)) = {c2}, ∅, PEs ((0, 2)) ={c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s4, s5}, PEs ((0, 3)) = {c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s4, s5}, PEs1((1, 0)) ={c1}, ∅ PEs ((2, 0)) = {c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s2}, PEs ((3, 0)) = {c1}, ∅ for s ∈
{s1, s2, s4}, PEs1((1, 1)) = {c1}, ∅, PEs4((1, 1)) = {c2}, ∅, PEs1((1, 2)) = {c1}, ∅,
PEs ((1, 2)) = {c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s4, s5}, PEs2((1, 3)) = {c1}, ∅, PEs ((1, 3)) ={c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s4, s5}, PEs ((2, 1)) = {c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s2}, PEs4((2, 1)) ={c2}, ∅, PEs ((3, 1)) = {c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s2, s4}, PEs5((3, 1)) = {c2}, ∅, PEs ((2,
2)) = {c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s2}, PEs ((2, 2)) = {c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s4, s5}, PEs ((2, 3))
= {c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s2, s4}, PEs ((2, 3)) = {c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s3, s5}, PEs ((3, 2)) =
{c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s2, s3, s4}, PEs ((3, 2)) = {c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s5}, PEs ((3, 3)) =
{c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s4, s5}, PEs ((3, 3)) = {c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s2, s3}. For any
qE ∈ QE(qR) and for any s ∈ S, if PEs (qE) is not defined in the above list,
assume PEs (qE) = ∅.
Under the college-optimal matching system ϕC, Table 1 below gives the
outcome allocations in the early decision period for each pure strategy in
QE(qR). The first entry in each cell is the assignment of c1 and the second
entry is the assignment of c2. Those students who are not assigned to either
c1 or c2 remain unassigned in the early decision period.
Table 1.
qEc2 = 0 q
E
c2 = 1 q
E
c2 = 2 q
E
c2 = 3
qEc1 = 0 ∅, ∅ ∅, {s4} ∅, {s4, s5} ∅, {s1, s4, s5}
qEc1 = 1 {s1}, ∅ {s1}, {s4} {s1}, {s4, s5} {s2}, {s1, s4, s5}
qEc1 = 2 {s1, s2}, ∅ {s1, s2}, {s4} {s1, s2}, {s4, s5} {s2, s4}, {s1, s3, s5}
qEc1 = 3 {s1, s2, s4}, ∅ {s1, s2, s4}, {s5} {s2, s3, s4}, {s1, s5} {s4, s5}, {s1, s2, s3}
In Table 2, we give the outcome allocations in the regular decision period
for each pure strategy qE ∈ QE(qR) and the corresponding matching ϕEC(qE,
RE(qE)) at early decision.
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Table 2.
qEc2 = 0 q
E
c2 = 1 q
E
c2 = 2 q
E
c2 = 3
qEc1 = 0 {s4, s5}, {s1, s2, s3} {s2, s5}, {s1, s3, s4} {s2, s3}, {s1, s4, s5} {s2, s3}, {s1, s4, s5}
qEc1 = 1 {s1, s4, s5}, {s2, s3} {s1, s5}, {s2, s3, s4} {s1, s2}, {s3, s4, s5} {s2, s3}, {s1, s4, s5}
qEc1 = 2 {s1, s2, s4}, {s3, s5} {s1, s2, s5}, {s3, s4} {s1, s2}, {s3, s4, s5} {s2, s4}, {s1, s3, s5}
qEc1 = 3 {s1, s2, s4}, {s3, s5} {s1, s2, s4}, {s3, s5} {s2, s3, s4}, {s1, s5} {s4, s5}, {s1, s2, s3}
According to the preferences of colleges, their best response correspon-
dences are:
βϕCc1 (0) = {2, 3}, βϕCc1 (1) = {3}, βϕCc1 (2) = {3}, βϕCc1 (3) = {2},
βϕCc2 (0) = {2, 3}, βϕCc2 (1) = {3}, βϕCc2 (2) = {2}, βϕCc2 (3) = {3}.
Therefore the game has no pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 6. We prove by an example. Consider the regular
decision market (C,S, qR, RR) with C = {c1, c2}, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}, qRc1 =
3, qRc2 = 3, and the following preference profile for colleges and students:
PRc1 = {s1}, {s2}, {s5}, {s3}, {s4}, ∅,
PRc2 = {s2}, {s5}, {s1}, {s4}, {s3}, ∅, with {s2, s3}PRc2 {s1, s4},
with S0 PRc S
00
for any c ∈ C and for any S0, S 00 ⊆ S such that |S0| > |S00|,
PRs = {c2}, {c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s3, s5},
PRs2 = {c1}, {c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s2, s4}.
We have QEc (qR) = {0, 1, 2, 3} for all c ∈ C. Let PEc (qE) = PRc for all
qE ∈ QE(qR) and for all c ∈ C.
Moreover, let PEs ((0, 0)) = ∅ for s ∈ S, PEs2((0, 1)) = {c2}, ∅, PEs ((0, 2)) ={c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s2, s5}, PEs ((0, 3)) = {c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s2, s5}, PEs1((1, 0)) ={c1}, ∅ PEs ((2, 0)) = {c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s2}, PEs ((3, 0)) = {c1}, ∅ for s ∈
{s1, s2, s5}, PEs1((1, 1)) = {c1}, ∅, PEs2((1, 1)) = {c2}, ∅, PEs2((1, 2)) = {c1}, ∅,
PEs ((1, 2)) = {c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s5}, PEs2((1, 3)) = {c1}, ∅, PEs ((1, 3)) ={c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s4, s5}, PEs ((2, 1)) = {c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s2}, PEs5((2, 1)) ={c2}, ∅, PEs ((3, 1)) = {c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s2, s3}, PEs5((3, 1)) = {c2}, ∅, PEs ((2,
2)) = {c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s2, s3}, PEs ((2, 2)) = {c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s5}, PEs ((2, 3))
= {c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s2, s4}, PEs ((2, 3)) = {c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s3, s5}, PEs ((3, 2)) =
{c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s2, s3, s4}, PEs ((3, 2)) = {c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s5}, PEs ((3, 3)) =
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{c1}, ∅ for s ∈ {s2, s4}, PEs ((3, 3)) = {c2}, ∅ for s ∈ {s1, s3, s5}. For any
qE ∈ QE(qR) and for any s ∈ S, if PEs (qE) is not defined in the above list,
assume PEs (qE) = ∅.
Under the student-optimal matching system ϕS, Table 3 below (which
should be read as the previous tables) gives the outcome allocations of the
early admissions game for each pure strategy qE.
Table 3.
qEc2 = 0 q
E
c2 = 1 q
E
c2 = 2 q
E
c2 = 3
qEc1 = 0 ∅, ∅ ∅, {s2} ∅, {s2, s5} ∅, {s1, s2, s5}
qEc1 = 1 {s1}, ∅ {s1}, {s2} {s2}, {s1, s5} {s2}, {s1, s4, s5}
qEc1 = 2 {s1, s2}, ∅ {s1, s2}, {s5} {s2, s3}, {s1, s5} {s2, s4}, {s1, s3, s5}
qEc1 = 3 {s1, s2, s5}, ∅ {s1, s2, s3}, {s5} {s2, s3, s4}, {s1, s5} {s2, s4}, {s1, s3, s5}
In Table 4, we give the outcome allocations in the regular decision period
for each pure strategy qE and the corresponding matching ϕES (q
E, RE(qE))
at early decision.
Table 4.
qEc2 = 0 q
E
c2 = 1 q
E
c2 = 2 q
E
c2 = 3
qEc1 = 0 {s2, s4}, {s1, s3, s5} {s3, s4}, {s1, s2, s5} {s3, s4}, {s1, s2, s5} {s3, s4}, {s1, s2, s5}
qEc1 = 1 {s1, s2, s4}, {s3, s5} {s1, s4}, {s2, s3, s5} {s2, s4}, {s1, s3, s5} {s2, s3}, {s1, s5, s5}
qEc1 = 2 {s1, s2, s4}, {s3, s5} {s1, s2, s4}, {s3, s5} {s2, s3, s4}, {s1, s5} {s2, s4}, {s1, s3, s5}
qEc1 = 3 {s1, s2, s5}, {s3, s4} {s1, s2, s3}, {s4, s5} {s2, s3, s4}, {s1, s5} {s2, s4}, {s1, s3, s5}
According to the preferences of colleges, their best response correspon-
dences are:
βϕSc1 (0) = {3}, βϕSc1 (1) = {3}, βϕSc1 (2) = {2, 3}, βϕSc1 (3) = {1},
βϕSc2 (0) = {2, 3}, βϕSc2 (1) = {1}, βϕSc2 (2) = {3}, βϕSc2 (3) = {3}.
Therefore, the game has no pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1. Here, we extend the proof of Lemma 2 in Konishi
and Ünver (2006). Let (C, S, qR, qE, RR, RE) be a college admissions market,
where qR ∈ Nn+, qE ∈ QE(qR), RR ∈ RR−CC , and RE ∈ RE(RR, qE) ∩
RE−CC . We will show that (μˆE, μˆR) is the unique pair of stable matchings
in the early and regular decision periods.
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Consider any stable matching μE in the early decision period. If lˆE = 0,
then μE(s) = ∅ for all s ∈ S. If lˆE > 0, we have μE(s1) = ChEs1(REs1 , CE,1), for
otherwise the pair (s1, ChEs1(R
E
s1, C
E,1)) would block μE if ChEs1(R
E
s1, C
E,1) 6=
∅; and s1 would be better oﬀ by staying unmatched if ChEs1(REs1 , CE,1) = ∅.
If lˆE > 1, first note that CE,t ⊇ CE,t+1 for any t ≤ lˆE − 1, since CE,t
monotonically shrinks (weakly) by construction. Then, given μE(s1), we
have μE(s2) = ChEs2(R
E
s2, C
E,2), for otherwise the pair (s2, ChEs2(R
E
s2, C
E,2))
would block μE if ChEs2(R
E
s2 , C
E,2) 6= ∅; and s2 would be better oﬀ by staying
unmatched if ChEs2(R
E
s2, C
E,2) = ∅. Similarly, for any t ≤ lˆE, μE(st) =
ChEst(R
E
st, C
E,t). Thus, we must have μE = μˆE.
Now given μˆE, consider any stable matching μR in the regular decision
period. If lˆR = 0, then μR(s) = μˆE(s) = ∅ for all s ∈ S. Now consider
the case in which lˆR > 0. Clearly, μR(s) = μˆE(s) for all s ∈ {s1, s2, ..., slˆR}
such that μˆE(s) 6= ∅. Moreover, we have μR(s1) = ChRs1(RRs1, CR,1(μˆE)) if
μˆE(s1) = ∅, for otherwise the pair (s1, ChRs1(RRs1, CR,1(μˆ
E))) would block μR
if ChRs1(R
R
s1, C
R,1(μˆE)) 6= ∅; and s1 would be better oﬀ by staying unmatched
if ChRs1(R
R
s1, C
R,1(μˆE)) = ∅. If lˆR > 1, first note that CR,t(μˆE) ⊇ CR,t+1(μˆE)
for any t ≤ lˆR − 1, since CR,t(μˆE) monotonically shrinks (weakly) by con-
struction. Then, given μR(s1), we have μR(s2) = ChRs2(R
R
s2 , C
R,2(μˆE)) if
μˆE(s2) = ∅, for otherwise the pair (s2, ChRs2(RRs2 , CR,2(μˆ
E))) would block
μR if ChRs2(R
R
s2 , C
R,2(μˆE)) 6= ∅; and s2 would be better oﬀ by staying un-
matched if ChRs2(R
R
s2 , C
R,2(μˆE)) = ∅. Similarly, for any t ≤ lˆR, μR(st) =
ChRst(R
R
st, C
R,t(μˆE)) if μˆE(st) = ∅. Thus, we must have μR = μˆR.
Proof of Theorem 7. Let (C,S, qR, RR) be a regular decision market
such that RR ∈ RR−CC . Let the early decision preference of each col-
lege c ∈ C be REc (qE) = RRc for any qE ∈ QE(qR). Assume that for all
s ∈ S, Top(REs (qE); 1) ∈ {Top(RRs ; 1), ∅} for all qE ∈ QE(qR). Pick a college
c ∈ C. Consider any q0E ∈ QE(qR). Let ˆϕ be the unique stable match-
ing system in (C,S, qR, (qEc , q
0E
−c), RR, RE(qEc , q
0E
−c)) where qEc = 0. We have
ϕˆE(0, q0E−c, RE(0, q
0E
−c))(c) = ∅. Let ϕˆR((qR, RR), ϕˆE(0, q
0E
−c, RE(0, q
0E
−c)))(c) =
{sk, sl, ..., sr}, where k < l < ... < r ≤ n. With the report q0Ec ∈ QEc (qR) of
college c, we have ϕˆE(q0E, RE(q0E))(c)\{sk, sl, ..., sr} ⊆ {sr+1, sr+2, ..., sn}.
We consider two cases: if ϕˆE(q0E, RE(q0E))(c)\{sk, sl, ..., sr} = ∅, then we
have ϕˆR((qR, RR), ϕˆE(q0E, RE(q0E)))(c) = {sk, sl, ..., sr} by the construction
of ϕˆR. Oppositely, if ϕˆE(q0E, RE(q0E))(c)\{sk, sl, ..., sr} 6= ∅, then it must
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be true that |{sk, sl, ..., sr}| = qRc , and ϕˆR((qR, RR), ϕˆE(q0E, RE(q0E)))(c)
= T ⊂ {sk, sl, ..., sr}∪{sr+1, sr+2, ..., sn} such that |T | = qRc by the construc-
tion of ϕˆR. Thus, we have (0, q0E−c)ºˆϕc q0E in both cases by the responsiveness
of colleges’ preferences.
Proof of Lemma 2. Here, we extend the proof of Lemma 3 in Konishi
and Ünver (2006). Let (C, S, qR, qE, RR, RE) be a college admissions market,
where qR ∈ Nn+, qE ∈ QE(qR), RR ∈ RR−CS, andRE ∈ RE(RR, qE)∩RE−CS.
We will show that (μ˜E, μ˜R) is the unique pair of stable matchings in the early
and regular decision periods.
Consider any stable matching μE in the early decision period. If SE(qE) =
∅, then μE(c) = ∅ for all c ∈ C. If SE(qE) 6= ∅, we have μE(c1) =
ChEc1(R
E
c1, q
E
c1 , S
E(qE)). Otherwise, if ChEc1(R
E
c1 , q
E
c1, S
E(qE)) 6= ∅, then for
some s ∈ ChEc1(REc1, qEc1 , SE(qE)), pair (s, c1) would block μE; and if ChEc1(REc1,
qEc1 , S
E(qE)) = ∅, then c1 would be better oﬀ by staying unmatched and de-
viating from μE. Notice also that for all c ∈ C\{c1}, we have μE(c) = ∅,
trivially. Thus, we must have μE = μ˜E.
Now given μ˜E, consider any stable matching μR in the regular decision
period. If l˜R = 0, then μR(c) = μ˜E(c) = ∅ for all c ∈ C. Now consider
the case in which l˜R > 0. Clearly, μR(c) ⊇ μ˜E(c) for all c ∈ C. More-
over, we have μR(c1)\μ˜E(c1) = ChRc1(R
R
c1, q
R,1
c1 , μ˜
E, SR,1(qE, qR)). Otherwise,
if ChRc1(R
R
c1 , q
R,1
c1 , μ˜
E, SR,1(qE, qR)) 6= ∅, then for some s ∈ ChRc1(RRc1 , qR,1c1 , μ˜E,
SR,1(qE, qR)) pair (s, c1) would block μR; and if ChRc1(R
R
c1 , q
R,1
c1 , μ˜
E, SR,1(qE,
qR)) = ∅, then c1 would be better oﬀ by staying unmatched and deviat-
ing from μR. If l˜R > 1, first note that SE,t(qE, qR) ⊇ SE,t+1(qE, qR) for any
t ≤ l˜E−1, since SE,t(qE, qR) monotonically shrinks (weakly) by construction.
Then, given μR(c1), we have μR(c2)\μ˜E(c2) = ChRc2(R
R
c2 , q
R,2
c2 , μ˜
E, SR,2(qE,
qR)). Otherwise, if ChRc2(R
R
c2, q
R,2
c2 , μ˜
E, SR,2(qE, qR)) 6= ∅, then for some s ∈
ChRc2(R
R
c2, q
R,2
c2 , μ˜
E, SR,2(qE, qR)) pair (s, c2) would block μR; and if ChRc2(R
R
c2,
qR,2c2 , μ˜
E, SR,2(qE, qR)) = ∅, then c2 would be better oﬀ by staying unmatched
and deviating from μR. Similarly, for any t ≤ l˜R, μR(ct)\μ˜E(ct) = ChRct(RRct,
qR,tct , μ˜
E, SR,t(qE, qR)). Thus, we must have μR = μ˜R.
Proof of Theorem 8. Let (C, S, qR, RR) be a regular decision mar-
ket such that RR ∈ RR−CS. Let the early decision preferences of col-
leges be (REc (qE))c∈C , for any qE ∈ QE(qR). Assume that for all s ∈ S,
Top(REs (qE); 1) ∈ {Top(RRs ; 1), ∅} for all qE ∈ QE(qR). Consider any qE ∈
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QE(qR). Let ˜ϕ be the unique stable matching system in (C, S, qR, qE, RR,
RE(qE)). Rename and reorder acceptable colleges by the preference order-
ing PRs of student s ∈ S as c1, c2, ..., clR(s). Let l˜R = max{lR(s) : s ∈
S}. If l˜R = 0, the proof is trivially complete. Suppose l˜R > 0. Let
S¯ = {s ∈ S : lR(s) > 0}. By assumption, Top(REs (qE); 1) ∈ {c1, ∅} for
all s ∈ S¯ and for all qE ∈ QE(qR). We have qEc ∈ β ˜ϕc (qE−c) for any col-
lege c such that c /∈ A(RRs ) for any s ∈ S¯. So, pick any college ct ∈
{c1, c2, ..., cl˜R}, and consider any feasible strategy q0Ect ∈ QEct(qR). Clearly, we
have ϕ˜R((qR, RR), ϕ˜E((q0Ect , q
E
−ct), R
E(q0Ect , q
E
−ct)))(ct) = ϕ˜
R((qR, RR), ϕ˜E(qE,
RE(qE)))(ct). (No college except for the top-ranked one with respect to the
common preferences of students can ever accept any student in the early de-
cision period. Given this, c1 is also impartial to any early quota decision.)
Therefore, qEct ∈ β
˜ϕ
ct(q
E
−ct).
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